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Schulin: Ranke's universal history

RANKE'S UNIVERSAL HIS10RY
AND NATIONAL HIS1DRY
ERNST SCHULIN

HERE IS NO DOUBT that Ranke was an eminently productive historian. His historiographic achievements were outstanding
even for the nineteenth century, which boasted both of diligent
writers who wrote multivolume works and of an equally diligent reading public. However, what he did not write were the two works which he himself
considered essential and which would have embodied all his intentions. The
one was a world history of the modern time, the other a German history
from the very beginning up to his present time. With his first published book,
Geschichten der romanischen und gennanischen Volker seit 1494, he did embark
on the former. But the project was not continued. Ranke contented himself
with presenting and writing the histories of individual European states on
universal viewpoints, in explicit modern epochs of mainly the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. He did eventually return to a world history. However, in casting fur back to classical antiquity, he only reached the early twelfth
century, falling short of the period he considered truly essential. His students prepared his German history in the ]ahrbiicher des Deutschen Reiches)
and he himself dealt selectively with crucial epochs in histories of the Reformation and ofPrussia, in Wallenstein) and in the history of the Fiirstenbund.
Other periods were treated in smaller studies. But the segments were never
drawn into a complete portrait, not even in his lectures.
We can decide only upon a closer look whether these were, or might have
become, his essential works. Of valuable assistance in such an investigation
are the pieces from his lectures, which were published by W. P. Fuchs and
H . V. Dotterweich in volume four of Aus Werk und Nachlafl (1975).

UNIVERSAL HIS'IORY OF THE MODERN PERIOD:
THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF STATES
Of initial and special interest is Ranke's basic approach to a world history
of the modern period-his interest in factors that are normally represented
only as the foreign political and military interrelations of European states.
We find this interest reflected in his essay of Die Groflen Miichte (1833), which
is a brief survey of the formation of Europe since the time of Louis XIV and
an exemplary description of the power shifts in international relations. In
the introduction, however, Ranke hastened to explain that he had in this
instance deliberately limited himself to describing "the great events;' to out-
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lining the progress of relations among the different nations. Of different
breadth and depth are his concurrent lectures, winter term 1833-34-, on the
early modern period, which also dealt with the foreign policies and wars of
the states; but the accent was on the nations themselves. They are the true
active agents in the general course of history through all ages. Between individual human life and humankind's universal history stand the nations; thus
already in 1825 the young Ranke stated: "Three objects must not be lost from
sight: the human species, the nations, the individual." 1 In 1833 he observed:
"We shall show how the human species gains consciousness of itself. It occurs in that the individual nations unite in systems of nations which, for a
certain period, dominate the world.,
The mature Ranke still insisted that universal history would degenerate
into "fantasies and philosophizing once it left the firm ground of national
histories." 3 This is by no means an entirely new or special notion. Ranke was
familiar with the world histories of eighteenth-century Gottingen historians
that emphasized the sequence and coexistential balance of states, the formation of state systems in general, and the formation of European states from
the sixteenth century onward in particular. Ranke was also familiar with
Johann Gottfried von Herder's sensitive probe into nations and their specific
national originality evident in national literatures. With particular insistence
Ranke attempted a synthesis of the systems of states and the nations animated
by national literature toward new self-awareness. In this synthesis he recognized the salient features of general modern history. Primarily indicative to
him was that world historical impetus had in modern times, from the sixteenth century onward, derived entirely from Europe. Like the historians of
the eighteenth century and of today, but to much firmer purpose than other
nineteenth-century historians, Ranke argued that in the past there had been
other nations and national systems of equal or superior power and culture.
It seemed characteristic to him, next, that Europe dominated the world not
as a unified empire (like Rome or China) but as a multiple, mutually conditioning system of states each hallmarked by a rise in national identity.
He demonstrated this in his lectures. The formation of nations was for
Ranke a tendency essentially independent of religion, although, as he emphasized, the process had already been set in motion in medieval times
through Christendom, while the persistent tendencies oflslam had been destructive and egalitarian. Protestantism had come to give an even stronger
impulse to the development of nations, each toward its own individual, confessional national unity. The sixteenth century, as he showed it, had been
conditioned less through the rivalries for power between Spain and France
than through national domestic struggles and consolidations. Ranke traced
these back primarily to the conflicts between monarchs and aristocracies but
also discovered common European developments, such as the turn to Catholicism by the French, the Dutch, and the Reich's nobility in 1580. The gathering forces of the counterrevolution then led to the war in Europe during
the seventeenth century. The struggles for power in the aftermath were secular
in nature and mainly directed against French predominance. The other Great
Powers-England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia-emerged at this point. With
the exception of England, these powers were under the rule of absolute
monarchs. Those under aristocratic rule-Spain, Poland, and the Reichwere marked by a loss in power.
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ANKE'S ANALYSIS related to internal conditions prevalent
in the different nations, whereby his interest touched also on the
parallelism, or disparity, of religious components and on the
power struggles between estates and monarchs in the different countries. He
was, besides, keenly aware of the cooperation and rivalries among the European states. These three viewpoints interlace, the third being by no means
the essential, or dominant, element. State formations and national formations are not one and the same thing, though Ranke was interested in the
results of their interactions. The general course of history, he concluded, was
from the late seventeenth century conditioned by shifting power constellations among the Great Powers, not simply by constellations among all European nations. The Great Powers (France, England, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia) were in turn conditioned by their specific domestic conditions. France
was, to Ranke, not only an exemplary modern monarchy, but also the first
completely unified national state, politically, religiously, and literarily. It had
been Richelieu's achievement of "reconciling all French people with France
and all France with the king."4 Its rise in power was the inevitable result and
was a danger to the whole of Europe.
England was a completely different nation and, because of its parliamentary constitution, a seemingly weaker nation, which Ranke came to admire.
In the form of two parties, stabilizing and creative forces were set free that,
by their very conflict, were not detrimental to the state, but rather were beneficial. It allowed even extreme liberal postulates to become politically valid
in the form of North America's emancipation from its colonists. 5 Ranke preferred to see England's role as a power balance on the Continent and its worlddominating role as a leading Western power in this context. Russia as anation seemed more problematic to Ranke. The "combination of a European
style of government and Slavic nationality lent strength to the country;' but
the foreign influences were hostile to the development of the people "toward truly moral and noble predispositions."6 Germany, politically and religiously divided, belonged in this duality-in the two states of Austria and
Prussia-to the Great Powers. After the recapture of Hungary, Ranke could
accept Austria as a new powerful state, as an amalgamation of multiple nationalities. He could not accept it as a nationality. In the case of Prussia he
argued that its rise in power under Frederick the Great had decisively contributed to the rebirth of German literature and national consciousness.
In their greatly different domestic formations, these five Great Powers had
dominated the European system of states since the seventeenth century and
were again doing so in the wake of the French Revolution and Napoleon.
"The formation of the Great Powers" Ranke jotted down for his 1832-33 lectures in respect to the entire modern period.
It has always been a matter of balance-in the beginning I would say
ofthe rivals Spain and France -later a balance ofinterests, French and
anti-French interests, the land powers' and the sea puwers' interests; but
that five Great Powers, each sovereign, each with particular interests,
would consult together on all important matters, so that-at least up
to this day albeit under the most difficult cirr::umstances-a solutwn has
always been found, that is new, it is the sense behind the present state
ofthings.7
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The strength ofhis convictions on the world historical importance of the
interactions of the Great Powers is thus signified in his lectures on modern
world history by the way he traced the links between external and internal
and, in turn, national perspectives. This perception is of central importance
for Ranke's historical approach. It is determinative for his entire historical
writing, and also essential for his historical theory, especially for his claim
of historical objectivity.
In his historical writing, however, such a design posed its own descriptive
problems. Such polyphony could neither be described as a static system nor
as a homogeneous development. It was, among others, a precarious blend
of both. Ranke rejected nothing more vehemently than the historicophilosophic doctrine that "the aim of universal history was to find a
genetic answer for the situation of the world today." 8 He had heard this as
a student in the very first lecture. He rejected this doctrine because it was
only partly correct. The European system of nations was old. In a shifting
web of constellations it had shaped itself after universal power constellations
or tendencies-the Roman Empire, Charlemagne, the papal hierarchy of the
late Middle Ages, French hegemonic presumptions under Louis XIV and
under Napoleon. And however static such constellations had been, their further developments and stabilizations had to be considered, without knowledge of a world historical end. Conflict must therefore be the salient point
of description: the tensions tending toward equilibrium or toward a new constellation of forces. "It is no constant development;' emphasized Ranke in
a lecture of r86r, "it is unending struggle between forces that permeate the
world. The Romanic and the Germanic world, Islam and Christendom, the
papacy and Imperial power, Protestants and Catholics, revolutionary and conservative tendencies resist one another, yet their conflict draws them together,
they are inseparably linked.''9 There is a good deal of simple faith contained
in this interpretation. It is this faithful trust in the harmonizing and finally
stabilizing confluent efficacy of particular interests and oppositional forces
that Ranke shared with the Scottish rational economic and social theories
of the eighteenth century and, later, ofliberalism. "In great danger;' Ranke
optimistically declared, "we can always put our trust in the guardian spirit
that has reliably saved Europe from being dominated by any one-sided or
violent tendency, has met pressure from the one side with pressure from the
other and has, in the union of the whole, happily saved freedom and individuality."10
But if conflict and shifting power constellations are thus the structural
components of his design, its own dilemma soon becomes apparent: narrowed down it might lead to the misunderstanding that international relations and wars were the cardinal points of Ranke's historical concepts, which
is not so. His vital interest touched on individual lives and the further progress of nations. "General history does not merely live from the interaction
among states and empires;' he explained in an r858 lecture on English history, "because that would be no more than a history of diplomatic relations:
it consists of what they have in common."11 But that, together with the respective individual national developments which landmarked modern world history, posed problems for integrative description. And it had not been achieved
in the Geschichten der romanischen und gennanischen Vo1ker, which was why
Ranke insisted on calling it "histories"- Geschichten-and not "the history"-
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die Geschichte. 12 In Die Groflen Miichte he talked about the "very instructive,
congenial" book that could be written about the various ways the national
forces in the states had benefited from monarchist policies hostile to the estates.13 He tried his hand at this in his lectures and would undoubtedly also
have liked to write the book. But his source-critical scholarship, the process
of tact-finding, and the attending imbalance of the theme as a whole forbade its realization. It had led him to particularize and to review individual
states: the Osmans, the Spanish monarchy, the Popes. Making a virtue out
of necessity, he began to write universal history from the angle of individual
nations: again, not in terms of integrated national histories but broken up
into national epochs of general historical significance whereby he aimed at
symmetry of original sources and epochal importance-albeit with varying
success. Adopting this method first for the history of his own country in
descriptions of the Reformation and of Prussia, he followed up with histories of other Great Powers: France and England. Ranke wrote national histories which were animated by European, and therefore universal, viewpoints.
This became his great and renowned historical genre in which he rose to
undisputed mastery. If it was, ostensibly, no general history of the modern
world, indirectly and through its universal integrants it seemed to be something like it. I have to emphasize that, by its very nature, it could not be
that, at least not in a balanced form. Imbalance and bias were unavoidable.
General trends in parallel but autonomous national developments receded
into the background and, even more so, the general European world influence.
In the foreground we find foreign policy and wars, admittedly not simply
as in general European histories, but yet in the form of evaluations of internal and external power constellations. In the case of Ranke's concept of Europe's development by virtue of conflicting national forces, we cannot speak
of a "primacy of foreign policies;' but we can speak of an inexorable interactive mechanism of internal and external constituents. A state marked by destructive internal conflicts can weaken externally, can be dominated by another
state, and can, eventually, put at risk the "European element" in European
history, like Poland in the eighteenth century. An externally ineffectual state
loses reputation internally, like France in the eighteenth century. History is
not entirely a matter of power constellations, but they do condition the entire historical process in such great measure that their manifestation becomes
the vital point of interest. Foreign policies are, in the Rankean concept, evaluated by means of the rich documentary evidence of diplomatic and warring
relations; domestic policies by means of often more abstract evaluation of
power structures: visible, for instance, in the conflict of centralizing and particularizing forces, mainly those between monarch and estates, state and
church, rival conservative and revolutionary tendencies in public opinion,
the result also of economic power and popular unrest. The "moral energies"
liberated in these conflicts are thereby fully integrated, but nonpolitical or
other elusive power fuctors recede into the background.
It has always been admired how much non-German history Ranke
described using this framework in a century devoted to national historiography, and how much more intensively so than would have been possible,
or necessary, in an integrative European history. If we look at his conceptual
design of a modern world history we become, however, aware of significant
limitations. Not all Great Powers are represented, and the choice of which
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period should be of world historical significance is not consistent and depended, in part, on the availability of source material and also on Ranke's
and his reading public's prevailing political and national mood. This is why
in the 1840s he did not realize his plan to write a history of the French Revolution. In the fifties he presented earlier French history as an antecedental
explanation for the country's power-political and hegemonic presumptions
which, in little changed form, had been a continuing challenge for the Europe and Germany of Ranke's time. English history was for the Ranke of the
sixties an exemplary development toward constitutionalism which, in the wake
of the 1848 Revolution, he was keen to recommend to Germany and Prussia.
If national German interests had already influenced these two publications
they did so to even greater purpose in the other two (Reformation and Prossian history) . It might be said that his activities for a modern world history
were often diverted or crossed by his preoccupation with a German history.

RANKE'S GERMAN HIS10RY
We turn now to the second nonwritten work of Ranke's. Ranke had indeed always felt dedicated to the task of writing a native history-an integrated
German history that would connect the German past with the German present. It was clearly German history much more than European history that
drew Ranke into his research on the Middle Ages. It is curious to see how
he interpreted and, in a certain sense, resolved it on universal perspectives,
which his lectures expressed with great clarity.
Ranke lectured quite often on German history with a focus on the Middle
Ages. Upon the perusal of earlier literature (Haberlin, C. A. Menzel, Luden,
Leo), he commented: ''A coherent and at the same time thorough history
remains to be written and would be of great merit. The French and the English have achieved more in the matter ofform . Hume especially succeeded
in being universally read and respected. But Hume, too, would have failed
on the German history. It is so infinitely extensive and manifold."' 4 Former
works had focused on the stance of the church, of the Reich; latter ones "on
that of the provinces." It seemed to him (in 1842) "that now the time has
come for a national viewpoint."' 5 Ranke's meticulous sifting of written source
evidence as to fact or fiction-whereby he sadly concluded that it had been
the twelfth century "that had deviated from the pure and proper conception
of history and precipitated itself into the fabulous" 16 -reminds us of Niebuhr's
critical reconstruction of Roman history.
The task was indeed fraught with difficulties. The German past was not
only a compound of complex elements; in Ranke's view it also far anteceded
those of other nations (he used to tie up their beginnings with the high or
late Middle Ages). But for the German nation-although it had, properly
speaking, not existed before the ninth century-he insisted on starting with
the Teutons of Roman times. This was the current of eighteenth-century opinion and also the scholarly opinion of his own time. In reflecting it, Ranke
appears more Germanophile than he does otherwise with his emphasis on ·
the Romanic-Germanic. To Ranke, the Germans were a far more historic,
older nation than the French, English, Italians, Spaniards, Poles, Hungarians, or Russians, whose "elements" had not been "unified" until the tenth
or twelfth, or even fifteenth, centuries. And he hotly disputed the notion
of these others as "naturally grown." "In contrast to that we find the Ger-
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man tribes, by which I mean those same tribes from which evolved our nation of today, as fur back as the 2nd century BC and as soon as the West of
Europe opened itself to historical cognizance. From 2000 years ago we find
them in historically recorded continuous development."17 In this long development he recognized three prominent features. There was first the influence exerted on other, later nations: "It is quite clear that the great
nationalities, the French and the English above all but also earlier Italy, and
Russia of even latter times, would never have been formed without the great
Germanic nation. Just as infinite has been the contribution by the German
essence [Wesen] on the formation of the modern world altogether." There
was second the conspicuous purity of the German nationality; for "since the
first possessions there have been no further immigrations to Germany!' There
was third the "multiplicity of conditions [and] national formations from her
lap."~ 8 All religious, political, and cultural directions of Europe coexisted in
Germany, Ranke asserted with enthusiasm in his lectures of the fifties. "From
the multiplicity in even common features grows her ideal unity and inherent
strength, she is a power in the world ."~ 9 Not least that two of the Great
Powers, Austria and Prussia, "stemmed from her lap" confirmed to Ranke
that "Germany has ever been the centre of the aspirations of the whole
world." 20
Ranke's lofty historical perceptions of Germany's importance may lead us
to conclude that he meant to capture in Germany's history the fountainhead
and continuing essential, motivating elements of medieval and modern history, having conceived, in a closely similar manner, of the European system
of states as the powerful and cultural nucleus of the historical world. But
in so overdrawing his design he debarred himself from writing a national history of Germany. This might also explain why, in contrast to the other German historians and to the foreign historians of his time who nearly all wrote
national history, Ranke took to writing European history.
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I have conducted an investigation into the texture of Ranke's national and
universal conceptions and meanings, the particular slant of their configuration, and the resultant bias and cause for misunderstandings. I conclude with
a resume of Ranke's historiographic achievements. Leonard Krieger's book,
Ranke-The Meaning ofHistory, is the first detailed investigation into modulations in Ranke's historical writing and theories as conditioned by the personal circumstances and politics of his time. Absorbed with Ranke's constancy
in basic conceptions, his classicism of style, and his non partisanship in the
description of oppositional historical forces, we might easily overlook that
Ranke was a most restless, inquisitive historian with an easy grasp of selection and interpretation, a many-faceted thinker untiringly bent on formulating
the larger contexts under new impressions, sometimes only by way of experiment. Krieger conjectured that Ranke became a historian because it was
only in history, historical sequence, and duality that he could reconcile the
otherwise incompatible elements in human life. 21 Historical vitality and effectiveness of the European nations were of lifelong fascination to him, yet it
is undeniable that he depicted them with shifting accents.
In the r82os he essentially accentuated their unity, their confluent efficacy-
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but with more insistence and wishful thinking than his descriptions could
substantiate. The Geschichten der romanischen undgmnanischen Volker were not
continued. What followed instead were portraits of single states with the focus on internal structures. In this manner he described first the Osmans and
the Spanish monarchy and subsequently broke the project off with the church
state (The History of the Popes). Geographically he had so far kept to southern
Europe (also with his special study on the Serbian revolution). In the thirties and forties, after the July Revolution, he emphasized the individuality,
special features, and tasks of each European nation, in answer, it may be assumed, to the liberal ideas emanating from France. With his publications
in the Historisch-politische Zeitschrift he tried to stem the flow of these ideas
inside Germany. The historical essay on Die Grofien Miichte dates from this
time. His new commitment to German history also arose in this context.
Nations were "ideas of God" to him, each having different principles. But
that does not mean that Ranke wrote national histories focused only on the
political systems of Europe; his national histories had Christian-universal orientations. In this manner, The History ofthe Popes far outgrew its original framework, and the contours were cast for the Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der
Reformation. In the religious-political reform of the hierarchic order of the
Middle Ages Ranke showed the progressive world historical movement. His
next project was to be a description of the subsequent world historical change:
the French Revolution. He visited the Paris archives but dropped the plan.
He had found such an abundance of material on Prussian history that he
decided to stay on home ground and render a description of this youngest
Great Power, now placed within the larger system of the European states.
In the fifties and sixties, after the 18-48 Revolution, Ranke became increasingly disillusioned with the course of history, and with national movements.
He turned his interest to following the development of the strong, capable
state; constitutionalism and nationalism-inasmuch as they could favorably
contribute-had to be worked into the design. He wrote the histories of the
two nations which had been both exemplary and dominant in postreformative times because of closely corresponding but different national formations:
French history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and English history of mainly the seventeenth century. Geographically this brought him from
southern Europe via Germany to western Europe. It was "world history on
national perspectives;' as Krieger wrote; then "world history on a German
perspective;' meaning the fragments on German history which Ranke published after 1867 under the impression of the German unification movement;
and finally "world history on universal perspectives;' which relates, on the
one hand, to a fragment on the French Revolution (Ursprung und Beginn der
Revolutionskriege) and, on the other, to the Weltgeschichte of classical and medieval times, which is the last, unfinished, work of Ranke's. No doubt, there
are some historians who worked with more thematic homogeneity and there
are those who worked more heterogenously, but-despite all the visible
cleavages and reorientations-there is no collected work of such
breadth and unity. To this extent, Ranke's work
faithfully reflects his theme:
modern Europe.
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